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FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: IS A GRAND JURY
SUBPOENA A COURT ORDER?
The American economy depends, in large part, on the credit system.1
The credit system in the United States functions effectively by means of
credit reporting agencies that gather information on an individual's
creditworthiness for possible future dissemination to merchants and
other lenders.' Businessmen need credit information in order to make
' The term credit system refers to the practice of contracting debts to purchase goods
and services. J. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 177 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as RULE]. Liberal lending policies permit individual Americans lacking cash-in-hand to pur-
chase many essential items such as home appliances, houses, and cars. Id. at 178; James &
Fr~gomen, The Uniform .Consumer Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V
and VI, 57 GEO. L. J. 923, 924 (1969) [hereinafter cited as James & Fragomen]. Businesses as
well as consumers benefit from the use of credit. RULE, supra, at 178. Indeed, large retail
firms sometimes gross major profits from collection of interest charges. Id.
Due to the advantages the credit system afforded both consumers and businessmen,
the American economy transformed itself in the years following World War II from a "pay-
as-you-go" to a "buy-now-pay-later" system. James & Fragomen, supra, at 923. Since 1945,
consumer credit has grown at a rate four and one half times the growth rate of the national
economy. 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1966. In 1968, the consumer debt was reported
as $105 billion in outstanding bills and $8 billion in monthly credit extensions, a total figure
representing 12% of the gross national product. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on An-
titrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary Pursuant to S. Res. 233, 90th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1968). In 1979, the outstanding consumer debt totalled $382 billion.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 527 (1980) (data of Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts-Credit Market Debt Outstanding
1960-1979, Table 865). Almost every adult American has information about his credit rating
contained in a credit reporting agency's files. 115 CONG. REC. 33,408 (1969) (statement by
Sen. William Proxmire, main sponsor of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)). See
generally H. BLACK, BUY Now, PAY LATER 37 (1961) ("If your name is not in the records of at
least one credit bureau, it doesn't mean that you don't rate. What it does mean is that you
are either under twenty-one or dead."); McNamara, The Fair Credit Reporting Act- A
Legislative Overview, 22 PUB. L. J. 67, 67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McNamara] (credit
system has become permanent fixture in American life); Note, Fair Credit Reporting: Are
Misleading Reports Reasonable? 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 111, 111 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Misleading Reports] (credit reports are indispensable to business); Note, Credit Investiga-
tions and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEO. L. J. 509, 509 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Credit Investigations] (cash transaction will become as rare as the
American bald eagle).
2 McNamara, supra note 1, at 68. The remarkable growth of the installment credit in-
dustry was responsible for a parallel expansion of the agencies that supply consumer credit
information. Comment, The Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments: Enforcement of the
Legislative Trust? 45 MIss. L. J. 95, 96 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Trust].
Originally, the credit system operated by means of information exchange regarding a
customer's credit reliability between merchants. McNamara, supra note 1, at 68. If a mer-
chant was unable to obtain information on a particular individual, the businessman would
send an agent to determine the individual's creditworthiness. Id. Eventually the agents
formed independent agencies, which are today essential to the maintenance of a credit
system. Id. Indeed, credit agencies that use electronic data processing techniques are big
business. Id. As of 1974, approximately 2,600 credit bureaus operated throughout the
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sound judgments about with whom to engage in commercial transac-
tions.' Operating concurrently with the commercial need for access to
consumer credit information, however, is the individual's right to
privacy.4 Especially in today's computerized society, information pro-
United States. Feldman, The Fair Credit Reporting Act-From the Regulators Vantage
Point, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 459, 460 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Feldman]. The nation's
credit bureaus furnished approximately 100 million reports per year by 1974. Id.; see RULE,
supra note 1, at 179.
McNamara, supra note 1, at 68. Credit bureaus provide merchants with easily ac-
cessible information concerning credit standing that enables the businessmen to screen
customers who may be bad credit risks. Id. A favorable credit report is a necessary condi-
tion for granting credit. RULE, supra note 1, at 177. Credit agencies thus perform a vital role
in assuring the free flow of credit. McNamara, supra note 1, at 68-69.
' See Comment, The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information. Striking a Balance
Between Personal Privacy Interests and Organizational Information Needs, 44 ALB. L. R.
589, 601 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Use and Abuse]. The legal recognition of the right to
privacy originated, in part, due to an 1890 Harvard Law Review article penned by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis. Id. at 593; see Warren -& Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter cited as Warren & Brandeis]; cf. Note, The Right to
Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892 (1981) (analysis of social and
legal concepts existing in nineteenth century America supports conclusions of Warren and
Brandeis that right of privacy has legal foundation). Warren and Brandeis maintained that
court-granted protections of intellectual and artistic property rights constituted a right of
privacy in the individual. See Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 198-205. The development of
right to privacy jurisprudence stems from two major sources, the common law and the
United States Constitution. See Use and Abuse, supra, at 593-99.
The common law recognizes four causes of action in tort for invasion of privacy. Id. at
599. The four torts include appropriation of the plaintiff's name or image for advertising
purposes, misrepresentation of the plaintiff's reputation by false publicity, intrusion upon
the plaintiff's solitude, and public disclosure of acts concerning the plaintiff's private life.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
The second source of right to privacy jurisprudence derives from judicial interpreta-
tion of the United States Constitution. Note, Fair Credit Reporting Act: The Case for Revi-
sion, 10 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 409, 416 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Case for Revision].
Although the Constitution makes no specific mention of the right to privacy, the Supreme
Court has found an implicit right to privacy under the first and fourth amendments, and a
privacy right coming within the penumbral emanations of the ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Use and Abuse, supra, at 593-94; see U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, IX, & XIV; see, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right of privacy founded in fourteenth amendment ex-
tends to woman's freedom to have abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(right of privacy is individual's right to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into
fundamental decisions pertaining to contraception); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351-52 (1967) (constitutional protections extend under fourth amendment to what individual
seeks to protect as private); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (state law
forbidding use of contraceptives violates right of privacy emanating from penumbra of Bill
of Rights); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466-67 (1958) (right to
privacy in associations is peripheral first amendment right).
The right to informational privacy is an expansion of the traditional right "to be let
alone." See McNamara, supra note 1, at 88-92 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (overruled Olmstead). Informational privacy rights imply that an individual should
have the ability to control the collection and dissemination of information pertaining to his
private life. The Case for Revision, supra, at 419; Use and Abuse, supra, at 600-01.
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cessing techniques may infringe on the scope of an individual's informa-
tional privacy.' An individual cannot expect to receive credit, insurance,
or government-sponsored benefits without giving up the degree of per-
sonal freedom necessary to enable businessmen and governmental agen-
cies to make responsible decisions.8 Safeguards, however, are necessary
I Rapid scientific and social changes created a need to make informed business deci-
sions more rapidly. D. SANDERS, COMPUTERS AND MANGEMENT IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 53-54
(2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as SANDERS]. The computer provides the means with which to
handle the complex decisions of today's business world. Id. Many organizations have em-
braced computers as a natural informational tool. Use and Abuse, supra, at 589-90. The
depersonalization of information processing jeopardizes an individuars right to privacy
more significantly than the more inefficient and less widespread information exchange
method that merchants employed prior to the advent of big business credit agencies. Id. at
589; see note 2 supra. See generally RULE, supra note 1, at 205-12. Additionally, computer
errors regarding programming, incorrect data output, and incorrect interpretation are not
easily detectable. McNamara, supra note 1, at 87-88. Security problems also jeopardize
privacy rights since the data contained in computer banks are available to anyone with an
access key. Id. at 89.
Without deciding the issue, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
threat to privacy accompanying computerized data collection techniques, especially when
the government is the purchaser of information. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)
(threat to privacy implicit in collection of personal information in government-maintained
data banks). See generally 115 CONG. REC. 2411-13 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William
Proxmire).
Use and Abuse, supra note 4, at 601. The consumer must waive some objections to
the collection of credit information, but the information-gathering activity should not sur-
pass the limits of relevancy and necessity and should employ techniques that are both fair
and minimally intrusive. Id.
The rapid expansion in the use of credit and the parallel growth in the reporting in-
dustry precipitated quality control problems relating to dissemination of erroneous informa-
tion and invasion of privacy. Legislative Trust, supra note 2, at 96-97. One area of potential
abuse stems from the widespread use of credit reports beyond the traditional merchant-
customer relationship. See Credit Investigations, supra note 1, at 510; Feldman, supra note
2, at 461. The subscribers to the services of credit reporting agencies include traditional
lenders, retailers, and service industries including oil companies. Credit Investigations,
supra note 1, at 510. Yet, other subscribers consistently use credit reports in making deci-
sions that relate only indirectly to the granting of credit. See id. Insurance companies pur-
chase millions of credit reports each year to evaluate the risks involved in granting in-
dividuals different types of insurance. Feldman, supra note 2, at 461. Prospective employers
use credit reports to evaluate applicants. Id. Landlords also retain credit bureau services.
Credit Investigations, supra note 1, at 510. Consequently, credit reporting agencies include
a wide range of informational details in each report. For example, a typical report lists an
individual's basic identification and credit items such as name, address, marital status, bank
references, and bill-paying habits. Id. A report also may detail the individual's salary, bank
balance, outstanding debts, current charge accounts, and employment history. Id. Credit
reports often include legal actions such as records of arrest, divorce, and law suits. Id. Most
intrusively, a credit report may provide less verifiable information concerning an
individual's drinking habits, the nature of his character, or his reputation in the community.
Id. The sources for the credit bureau's files are also diverse, ranging from public records to
employers and neighbors. Id. Due to biased sources or incomplete investigations, a credit
agency may prepare an obsolete report or ofie containing irrelevant information that causes
considerable problems for the individual. Id. at 511; McNamara, supra note 1, at 84. For
specific examples of individuals who have encountered problems due to intrusive and inac-
curate reports, see 115 CONG. REc. 2411-13 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire).
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to prevent the possibility of abuse in the field of information collection
and dissemination.
In 1970, Congress provided one such safeguard when it enacted the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).' The FCRA attempts to balance the
need for credit reporting against the consumer's right to privacy in sec-
tion 1681b of Title 15 of the United States Code (section 1681b).1 Section
1681b sets forth the basis upon which a consumer reporting agency"0
may furnish credit information." Normally, a credit bureau governed by
McNamara, supra note 1, at 68. Prior to the enactment of the FCRA, a consumer had
no control over the content of credit reports and no ability to correct errors. Legislative
Trust, supra note 2, at 97-98. The consumer also had no adequate remedy against reporting
agencies that had made errors or invaded individual privacy in compiling the report. Id.
Although private causes of action exist under a tort or constitutional law theory, such
means of redress are too costly and time consuming for individual consumers to pursue. See
Use and Abuse, supra note 4, at 598. Furthermore, before 1971, the consumer reporting in-
dustry was largely unregulated. Feldman, supra note 2, at 461. Only one state had legisla-
tion regulating credit bureaus at the time of enactment of the FCRA. See OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 81-85 (1955); 115 CONG. REC. 2414 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire).
8 Pub. L. No. 91-508, Title VI, 84 Stat. 1127 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§
1681-1681t (1976 & Supp. II 1978)). Congress enacted the FCRA on October 26, 1970, but the
FCRA did not become effective until April 25, 1971. Other federal legislation designed to
protect an individual right to privacy includes the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-3422 (Supp. IV 1980) and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
9 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976); see Misleading Reports, supra note 1, at 112-13; notes 2-6
supra. Congress intended that the FCRA protect consumers and regulate the credit repor-
ting industry with a minimum amount of disruption and additional expense. Feldman, supra
note 2, at 489. See also R. CLONTZ, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING MANUAL 1.3 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as CLONTZ].
"0 Under the FCRA, a consumer reporting agency is any person or organization who,
for monetary fees, regularly engages in the practice of gathering consumer credit informa-
tion with the ultimate purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. 15 U.S.C. §
1681(a)(f) (1976).
" Fair Credit Reporting Act, § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976). Section 1681b provides as
follows:
Permissible purposes of reports.
A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the
following circumstances and no other:
(1) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an
order.
(2) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it
relates.
(3) To a person which it has reason to believe-
(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transac-
action involving the consumer on whom the information is to be fur-
nished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection
of an account of, the consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting
of insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination
of the consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a
governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant's
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the FCRA 2 may issue credit reports only to persons or organizations
that have a legitimate business need for the information.1 3 Congress,
however, provided two exceptions to the legitimate business need re-
quirement.14 A consumer reporting agency also may furnish information
in accordance with the consumer's written instructions or in response to
a valid court order. 5 In recent years, a controversy has developed sur-
rounding the court order exception to the business need requirement."6
The controversy concerns whether a grand jury subpoena constitutes a
court order within the meaning of the FCRA.' Determination of the
issue requires analysis of both the congressional purpose behind enact-
ment of the FCRA18 and the nature and function of the grand jury in-
stitution."
financial responsibility or status; or
E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in con-
nection with a business transaction involving the consumer.
Id.
I2 The FCRA applies to any credit bureau that regularly engages in the gathering and
dissemination of credit information for a fee in interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §
1681(a)(f) (1976); CLONTZ, supra note 9, at 1.19-.21; note 10 supra.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976); see note 11 supra Exactly what constitutes a legitimate
business need is difficult to define. See 115 CONG. REc. 2413 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William
Proxmire). Apparently, the thrust of the FCRA's legitimate business need language is to in-
sure that only those persons or organizations who intend to use credit information in con-
nection with consumer credit or other transactions involving, for example, insurance, may
obtain consumer credit reports. Id. at 2415. In other words, credit bureaus should issue
reports only to organizations who need the information to protect themselves against
unreasonable business risks. The Case for Revision, supra note 4, at 424. Determining who
needs the inforrhation and to what extent is a difficult task. For example, automobile in-
surers need to know an individual's driving record before taking the risk of issuing in-,
surance to that person. Comment, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Con-
sumer Reports: Little Brother is Watching You, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 773, 802 (1975).
Life insurance companies need 'to know an individual's medical history and must determine
if the individual participates in hazardous hobbies and activities in evaluating insurance
risks. Id. Employers need information pertaining to an applicant's education, abilities, and
experience in determining the person's suitability for a particular position. Id. Presumably,
as a logical extension of these examples, a lawyer might claim that he has a legitimate need
for reports on his clients or prospective witnesses. See Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit
Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550, 558-59 (1972).
1, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976); see note 11 supra.
15 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976); see note 11 supra.
" See, e.g., In re Gren, 633 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Application to Quash Grand
Jury Subpoena, 526 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Md. 1981; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
concerning Credit Bureau, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Vaughn, 496 F.
Supp. 1080 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Application
of Credit Info. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); notes 6-7 infra. See generally
Williams, Discovery and the Privacy Act- Exemption (b}111 to the Conditions of Disclosure:
What Qualifies As an "Order of the Court'? 15 RICH. L. REv. 439 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Williams].
"2 See text accompanying notes 68-76 infra.
"o See text accompanying notes 20-35 infra.
19 See text accompanying notes 38-65 infra.
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The FCRA closely parallels Senate Bill 823, one predecessor of the
current statute.0 The purpose of Senate Bill 823 was to require credit
bureaus to institute reasonable procedures for guaranteeing both the ac-
curacy and confidentiality of information contained in each consumer's
file.21 The sponsors of the bill were concerned particularly about the
need for confidentiality as a means to secure an individual's right to
privacy." A question arose concerning governmental access to credit
reports due largely to the American democratic philosophy that
discourages intrusive government surveillance of its citizens' private
lives.2"
See Congressional Record, S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 2415-16
(1969); McNamara, supra note 1, at 92-93. Senator William Proxmire sponsored Senate Bill
823, which was the primary source for the FCRA's finalized version. Id. The FCRA had
more remote origins in 1968 when Congressman Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin introduced
the first Fair Credit Reporting Bill. See H.R. 15267, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Zablocki's
bill, however, was never reported out of the House Committee on Banking and Currency.
See McNamara, supra note 1, at 74. Subsequently, the House Subcommittee on Invasion of
Privacy began hearings on credit bureaus. Id. at 75. In an effort to forestall legislation, the
credit bureau industry held meetings to establish procedural guidelines designed to curb
the abuses of the credit reporting industry. See Legislative Trust, supra note 2, at 103-04.
See generally Denny, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 88 BANKING L. J. 579 (1971) (infor-
mal chronological development of credit reporting legislation). The credit industry's
guidelines, although impressive, did not satisfy Senator Proxmire's wish to protect the
American consumer's right to privacy. See McNamara, supra note 1, at 76-77; CLONTZ, supra
note 9, at 1.6-1.7. Proxmire accordingly introduced Senate Bill 823 two and one half weeks
after the credit industry announced its guidelines. McNamara, supra note 1, at 77.
2 115 CONG. REC. 2414 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire).
See 115 CONG. REC. 2413 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire while introducing
Senate Bill 823). Senator Proxmire noted the disturbing lack of public standards to insure
that credit information remain confidential unless subscribers of credit reporting services
legitimately use the information for its intended purpose. Id.; see note 7 supra. Credit
bureaus maintain in their consumer credit files information pertaining to a person's employ-
ment, income, marital status, habits, characters, morals, and bill paying records. 115 CONG.
REC. 2413 (1969); note 6 supra.
Proxmire noted that during the 1960s, the executive branch had proposed the
establishment of a national data bank that would contain the type of personal information
that credit reporting agencies store. 115 CONG. REC. 2410-11 (1969). The plan met with
vigorous opposition due to its "big brother" implications. Id. Proxmire contended that,
under private auspices, the credit reporting industry was amassing the same type of per-
sonal data bank with no public safeguards to assure confidentiality of-the information. Id.;
see notes 4-7 supra.
2 115 CONG. REC. 2413 (1969); see Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and
Proposals for the 1970's (pt. 1), 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1018-20 (1966). According to Mr.
Westin, modern democratic theory recognizes that an individual's interests extend beyond
political activity to include areas such as sports, arts, literature, religion, and family. Id. at
1019. Individuals freely assert claims to personal privacy against both the state and society
in order to pursue these nonpolitical interests without government intrusion. Id. A
democracy relies on privacy as a shield for individual life and on publicity as a check on
government interference. Id. Westin contrasts the democratic society with the totalitarian
state, which relies on secrecy and surveillance for the regime and on full disclosure for its
citizens. Id. at 1018-19; see note 22 supra.
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Prior to the enactment of the FCRA, credit agencies had diverse and
often vague policies concerning access to consumer credit files.24 A ma-
jority of credit bureaus freely issued credit reports to noncreditor
governmental investigatory agencies such as the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the grounds that volun-
tary cooperation with the agencies' investigations was in the public in-
terest." A few credit agencies jealously guarded the confidentiality of
consumer credit information and permitted noncreditors access only
upon the consumer's express consent." Senate Bill 823 favored the
limited access policy and provided that noncreditors could not receive
credit reports without the consumer's written permission.'
While Senate Bill 823 was pending before the Senate, the issue of
government access to credit information generated considerable discus-
sion and debate.' One faction contended that fourth amendment protec-
tions against unreasonable search and seizure extend to credit reports.'
An opposing faction maintained that governmental agencies concerned
1 15 CONG. REc. 2413 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire); 114 CONG. REC.
24,903 (1968) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire).
21 115 CONG. REc. 2413 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire).
28 Id.
2 114 CONG. REC. 24,903 (1968) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire); 115 CONG. REC.
2415 (1969), S. 823 § 164(f).
28 See 115 CONG. REC. 2413 (1969) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire). See also Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency on H.R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. At the hear-
ings on the House counterpart to Senate Bill 823, witnesses appearing before the subcom-
mittee debated over the contents of § 35 of H.R. 16340, which provided as follows:
Access by governmental agencies.
A consumer reporting agency may not furnish information on individuals in
its files, except identifying information such as names, addresses, former ad-
dresses, places of employment, or former places of employment to a governmental
agency for purposes other than those listed under section 34(b) unless pursuant to
legal process.
Id. at 154-55; see H.R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 35, Hearings at 7; notes 29-30 infra.
28 See Hearings, supra note 27, at 605-06. One representative of the pro-protection fac-
tion was Dr. Harry Jordan, Chairman of TRW, Information Services, Inc., who testified
before a House subcommittee concerning § 35 of H.R. 16340. TRW granted information to
governmental law-enforcement agencies only pursuant to legal process. See 115 CONG. REC.
2413 (1969). Jordan objected to the "pursuant to legal process" language of § 35 as not pro-
viding the consumer with any real protection. Hearings, supra note 28, at 154. In Jordan's
view, use of the "legal process" phrase left the abusive investigative procedures available to
governmental agencies intact. Id. at 154-55; see text accompanying notes 70-71 infra
(discussing prosecutorial use of subpoena power).
The American Civil Liberties Union also criticized § 35 since it would permit any
governmental agency to obtain any consumer information by means of a simple subpoena.
Hearings, supra note 28, at 233 (remarks of Mr. Speiser, Director, Washington Bureau,
ACLU). The view of the ACLU was that the subpoena process represented an inadequate
means to justify credit report dissemination. Id. The ACLU urged that the bill provide
more stringent procedures to give consumers notice and an opportunity to contest the re-
quest for information. Id.
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with the revenue and law enforcement departments should have
unlimited access to credit reports." Congress eventually rejected all pro-
posals that would permit the free flow of credit information to govern-
mental agencies. 1 In its final form, the FCRA permits government agen-
cies the right to receive only identifying information about a consumer
such as name, address, and places of employment.2 Absent a specific,
legitimate business need,33 a noncreditor may obtain credit information
only by means of the consumer's cooperation or the power of a court
order. 4 The FCRA thus represents a statutory compromise between the
individual's right to privacy and the business world's need for informa-
tion by permitting dissemination of more than identifying information
only upon the superior authorization of the consumer or the judicial
system. 5
Although the FCRA restricts access to intrusive information by
means of the court order requirement, the statute and its legislative
history neither mention the precise scope of the "court order" ter-
minology nor indicate whether a grand jury subpoena comes within the.
court order exception. One consideration in determining whether a
grand jury subpoena constitutes an adequate justification for the release
of credit reports consistent with the FCRA's privacy concerns 37 is the
nature and function of the grand jury institution and its subpoena
power. 8 Both the common law and federal statutes are responsible for
defining the scope of the grand jury's power and function. 9 At its incep-
11 See Hearings, supra note 28, at 605-06. Mr. Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney
General representing the United States Justice Department, urged that any legislation per-
taining to the credit reporting agency should permit the government's law-enforcement
agencies free access to credit reports. Id. at 605-06 (letter from Mr. Kleindienst). In a letter
to the House subcommittee, Kleindienst emphasized that credit reports are useful, and
often critical, in criminal investigations. Id. at 605. Credit reports often assist in locating
witnesses, suspects, and fugitives and in pinpointing the "makings" of white collar crimes.
Id. Requiring law enforcement agencies to obtain court orders would result in unnecessary
delays and an increased burden on the courts. Id. at 605-06. See also id. at 603-04 (letter
from Hugo Rinta, General Counsel of the United States Treasury) (urging that governmen-
tal law-enforcement agencies need access to credit reports).
31 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, §§ 604 & 608, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b & 1681f (1976); note
11 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 1681f (1976). Section 1681f of Title 15 operates independently of § 1681b.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976).
See note 13 supra.
3' See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1976; note 11 supra.
s See text accompanying note 15 supra.
See In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, 526 F. Supp. 1253, 1255-56 (D.
Md. 1981) (contrasting FCRA's silence on grand jury subpoena issue with Right to Financial
Privacy Act's specific exemption of grand jury subpoenas); text accompanying notes 85-97
infra.
See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
See text accompanying notes 39-55 infra.
3 See L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6:34 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as ORFIELD]. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3321-3328 (1976) and §§ 3331 &
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tion, the grand jury was an. inquisitorial body that decided whether to
charge individuals with particular crimes." Gradually, the grand jury
evolved into a two-function body, acting as a "sword" to combat crime
and as a "shield" to screen indictments. 41 Although the latter role was
responsible for the grand jury provision of the fifth amendment,42 the in-
vestigatory function retains greater significance in modern criminal pro-
cedure.
3
3332 (1976) (special grand jury provisions); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (grand jury procedure). This
note only considers federal grand jury proceedings. For a comprehensive summary of state
grand juries, see L. KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 247-365 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KATZ];
National Association of Attorneys General, Statewide Grand Juries (1977).
"0 See R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as YOUNGER]. The
grand jury institution originated in England during the reign of Henry II. Id. Originally, the
grand jury was an important accusatory instrument of the Crown. Id. at 2. Eventually,
however, the grand jury developed into an independent body that shielded the citizenry
from royal persecution. Id. To insure a broad range of inquiry, grand jurors made a pledge
of secrecy that made no exceptions, even in favor of the government. See PRIVACY PROTEC-
TION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 375 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as PERSONAL PRIVACY].
" Id. In the American colonies, the grand jury system took on an expanded role as an
investigatory and reporting agency that acted to correct public wrongs. Id.; M. FRANKEL &
G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FRANKEL & NAFTALIS]. The col-
onists viewed the grand jury as a shield for the individual against arbitrary or malevolent
prosecutors. Id. Indeed, the grand jury functioned as a bulwark of individual liberty by pro-
tecting subjects of investigations from premature or inappropriate public disclosure. PER-
SONAL PRIVACY, supra note 40, at 375. Additionally, the colonists viewed the grand jury in-
stitution as a kind of "people's watchdog" that would search out and disclose government
corruption or matters needing legislative attention. FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra, at 3. Dur-
ingthe industrial age, the institutional structure of the grand jury continued in the "watchdog"
vein. PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 40, at 375. The nature and scope of grand jury in-
vestigations created a need for grand jurors to have assistance in collecting and analyzing
information. Id. Government investigative agencies and attorneys provided the necessary
work-force. Id.
" See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1015 (5th
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as KAMISAR]. The fifth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution preserved the grand jury institution by requiring that grand juries initiate federal
prosecutions through presentment or indictment. Id. The fifth amendment provides in rele-
vant part: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... "U.S. CONST. amend. V. Present-
ment is the formal process by which a grand jury initiates an independent investigation and
makes charges. ORFIELD, supra note 39, § 6:107. An indictment is a formal charge that the
grand jury issues upon evidence established during a prosecutor's examination. See Note,
Grand Jury: A Prosecutor Need Not Present Exculpatory Evidence, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 110, 111 n.10 (1981). Although the fifth amendment refers to the term "presentment,"
federal law now provides only for use of the indictment. See KAMISAR, supra, at 1015 n.6;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (indictment and information).
' See KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 712-13. In the eighteenth century, in response to
public criticism, Congress made the calling of federal grand juries discretionary for indict-
ment purposes, except in capital cases. See KATZ, supra note 39, at 14; 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
Trained police departments and prosecutors can investigate individual crimes more effi-
ciently. KATZ, supra note 39, at 15. Grand juries are most useful, therefore, as devices to in-
vestigate government offenses. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court has recognized the grand jury's
broad investigatory powers that help to make the grand jury an effec-
tive and valuable prosecutorial device." The primary advantage of a
grand jury investigation is its subpoena power, which stems from the
grand jury's close connection with the court that impaneled it. 5 The
Supreme Court has stated that the force and weight of a grand jury sub-
poena would be meaningless without a link to the court that supplies the
enforcement contempt mechanism. 46 Subpoenas, however, are relatively
easy to obtain and are subject to few restrictions.4 ' Rule 17 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for example, permits the issuance
of a federal grand jury subpoena in blank by the clerk of court.4 1 In other
" See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). The Supreme Court noted that a
grand jury is a "grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the
scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts
of the probable result of the investigation .... Id. See also United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (law vests grand jury with substantial powers in order that grand jury
may adequately discharge its public responsibility).
"s See KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 713.
" United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974) (quoting FED. R. CRim. P.
17(c)) (grand jury must rely on court to compel production of documents and testimony of
witnesses). In Calandra, a grand jury questioned witness Calandra concerning loan-sharking
records that federal agents had obtained during a search of Calandra's office. Id. at 341.
Calandra claimed that since the agents illegally seized the evidence, questions pertaining to
the records were impermissible. Id. The Supreme Court agreed that the agents procured
the evidence in violation of the fourth amendment, but declined to extend the exclusionary
rule to grand jury proceedings. See id. at 348. In making its decision, the Calandra Court
reviewed the historical role and functions of the grand jury, citing with approval the follow-
ing language from Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), rev'd, 382 U.S. 162 (1965):
[A] grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains
an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative function without
the court's aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses. It is
the court's process which summons the witness to attend and give testimony, and
it is the court which must compel a witness to testify if, after appearing, he
refuses to do so.
414 U.S. at 346 n.4; accord, United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975).
A court compels compliance with grand jury subpoenas by means of the contempt pro-
cess. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g). For a thorough discussion of the contempt process in the grand
jury context, see Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Pro-
secutor and the Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1975).
" See Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions:
An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 651, 684 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Wilson & Matz]; note 73 infra (analysis of distinction between court
order and subpoena). Together with the search warrant with its stringent requirements of
probable cause, the grand jury subpoena represents the only form of a compulsory legal pro-
cess available for general inquiries into violations of the law. See PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra
note 40, at 376.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a). Rule 17(a) provides in pertinent part:
For attendance of Witnesses; Form; Issuance. A subpoena shall be issued by
the clerk under the seal of the court. It shall state the name of the court and the
title, if any, of the proceeding, and shall command each person to whom it is
directed to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified therein. The
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words, a judge rarely sees or approves a subpoena request unless the
prosecution moves for an order to compel or the subpoenaed party
moves to quash the request.49 Yet the Supreme Court has decided that
the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment does not apply
to grand jury subpoenas." A grand jury need show only the propriety of
its investigation and the relevance to that investigation of the sub-
poenaed items or testimony.5 1 Although the fourth amendment does pro-
tect against a grand jury subpoena that is unreasonably broad, 2 the
Supreme Court has refused to hamper a grand jury's investigatory
powers by application of the exclusionary rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings.53 Furthermore, a grand jury can serve a subpoena on anyone,
ranging from the target of the investigation to the President of the
United States. 4 Grand jury subpoenas, therefore, have a long reach,
enabling grand juries to have access to information more easily than
either the police or the courts. 5
Another factor adding to the grand jury's effectiveness as an in-
vestigatory agency is the secrecy requirement attached to grand jury
clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party
requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served....
Id.; see Wilson & Matz, supra note 47, at 684.
49 See note 73 infra (analysis of distinction between court order and subpoena and
judge's role in subpoena process).
I United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1973). In Dionisio, the Supreme Court
held that neither a summons to appear before the brand jury nor its directive to make a
voice recording violated the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Id. The Court noted that a grand jury must be able to carry on investigations
free from preliminary showings and other external hindrances if the grand jury is properly
to perform its constitutional mission. Id.
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I, 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973). In
Schofield I, the Third Circuit held that no contempt citation could issue if the government
could not show by affidavit that each subpoenaed item was relevant to the grand jury's in-
vestigation and was not sought for secondary purposes. Id. In a later decision, however, the
Third Circuit found sufficient a short affidavit declaring simply that the subpoenaed items
were necessary to the investigation. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 967 (3d
Cir.) cert denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). The government's burden to demonstrate relevance
is slight, however, since the grand jury must retain its broad investigatory powers. Id. at
965-66, 968; see Wilson & Matz, supra note 48, at 684-86.
1 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76-77 (1906). See also Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to
grand jury proceedings).
I See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353-55 (1974). The Calandra Court noted
that the grand jury traditionally has been permitted to pursue its investigatory functions
unimpeded by evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial. Id. The
Court maintained that any deterrence of police misconduct resulting from application of the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would be minimal compared to the potential
damage the rule could cause to the grand jury's functions. Id.
" Wilson & Matz, supra note 47, at 684".see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702
(1974); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973).
1 See text accompanying notes 45-54 supra.
1982] 1407
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
proceedings." Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
hibits any grand juror, interpreter, stenographer, or attorney from
disclosing matters occurring before the grand jury." Rule 6, however,
does not prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging testimony or
other matters revealed to him during the course of his examination. 8 At
least five objectives underlie the grand jury secrecy provisions. 9 The ob-
jectives are to prevent the escape of a person whose indictment may be
pending, to insure the grand jurors' freedom of deliberation, to prevent
tampering with witnesses scheduled to appear at trial, to encourage
citizens who have information on the commission of crimes to come
forth, and to protect the innocent accused from damaging public ex-
posure."0 The effectiveness of the majority of the objectives depends,
however, on the cooperation of the individuals involved,6' including both
persons who are subject to criminal contempt citations for unauthorized
disclosure of grand jury proceedings,62 and witnesses themselves who
often welcome the shroud of secrecy surrounding grand jury pro-
ceedings.13 Despite the contempt sanction, however, the threat of pro-
secution has not been entirely effective in preventing leaks to the
press.64 Nonetheless, with witness cooperation, grand jury secrecy rules
' See KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 715-16.
5, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Rule 6 provides for several exceptions to the general rule of
secrecy pertaining to grand jury proceedings. Id. 6(e)(3). Disclosure may be made to a
government attorney for use in the performance of his duties or pursuant to a court order.
Id.
Id.; see KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 716.
', See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958); KAMISAR,
supra note 42, at 716-17. At least one commentator has noted that the principal reason for
grand jury secrecy is to protect the innocent from injustice and irreparable injury in the
form of social stigma. Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Power, 17 F.R.D. 331,
333 (1954).
356 U.S. at 681-82 n.6.
61 KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 716-17.
62 See text accompanying notes 46 & 57 supra.
KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 716. Witnesses may be more willing to cooperate with a
grand jury investigation if they know that no public disclosure of their identities and
testimony will result. Id.
" See Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 41, at 85-86. The commentators state that grand
jury leaks are a nagging and persistent problem. Id. at 85. To counter the problem, the
authors suggest that Congress enact a specific statute that would criminally punish persons
who leak grand jury materials. Id. at 86. See also KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 717 n.f. In 1980,
the General Accounting Office issued a report on the security procedures of federal grand
juries. See 67 A.B.A. J. 144 (1981). According to the American Bar Journal, the report
revealed hundreds of instances of public disclosure of privileged information resulting in the
disappearance and possible murder of grand jury witnesses, delayed and frustrated in-
vestigations, and reputation damage of unindicted persons. Id. The report concluded that
the security provisions pertaining to grand jury investigations were not adequate to protect
grand jury secrecy since federal district courts took little or no precautions to limit access
to grand jury materials. Id. at 144-45.
The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission indicates that additional prob-
lems exist with respect to grand jury secrecy. See PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 40, at
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generally deter the leaks that accompany other types of investigations. 5
Due to the secrecy provisions of grand jury proceedings, therefore,
the grand jury system contains certain safeguards to assure a degree of
individual privacy.66 The question remains whether the safeguards pro-
vide the degree of privacy Congress intended to guarantee when it
enacted section 1681b of the FCRA.6 7 The majority of courts responding
to the subpoena question cast the inquiry strictly in terms of the nature
of the grand jury rather than in terms of the grand jury's privacy protec-
tions. 8 Generally, the courts are in agreement that the judiciary
technically controls the functions of grand juries.69 Yet, the majority of
375-78. The report points out that government attorneys are responsible for deciding when
to issue a grand jury subpoena. Id. at 376. Government attorneys and federal agents
organize the subpoenaed evidence, and prepare reports describing the contents of sub-
poenaed documents before deciding to present the evidence to the grand jury itself. Id. at
376-77. When the agents present the evidence to the grand jury, the information comes
under the grand jury's seal of secrecy. Id. at 377. Information that never comes before the
grand jury, however, is not subject to any secrecy requirements, but becomes part of an in-
vestigative record generally available for government use. Id. In essence, the report con-
cludes, grand jury subpoenas are administrative tools. Id. the traditional secrecy provisions
can no longer justify, therefore, the unique compulsion powers of the grand jury system. Id.
The Commission thus proposed that Congress statutorily provide both that evidence sub-
poenaed by the grand jury cannot be maintained in any record apart from those under the
seal of the grand jury, and that the grand jury may only subpoena documents in which an in-
dividual has a legitimate expectation of confidentiality under certain stringent conditions.
See id.
KAMISAR, supra note 42, at 716.
See text accompanying notes 44-65 supra.
'T See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra.
See, e.g., In re Gren, 633 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Application to Quash
Grand Jury Subpoena, 526 F. Supp. 1253, 1254-55 (D. Md. 1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Concerning Credit Bureau, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re
TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Application of Credit Info. Corp., 457
F. Supp. 969, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
At least one court has refused to participate in the debate concerning the characteriza-
tion of a grand jury as an arm of the prosecutor or an appendage of the court in determining
whether a grand jury subpoena constitutes a court order under the FCRA. See In re
Vaughn, 496 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (N.D. Ga. 1980). In concluding that a grand jury subpoena is
not a court order, the Vaughn court mentioned the debate, but based its decision on factors
indicating that a court order is superior in power to a subpoena. See 496 F. Supp. at 1082-83;
note 73 infra (analysis of distinction between court order and subpoena).
" See, e.g., In re Gren, 663 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1980) (true that courts are responsi-
ble for calling grand juries into existence); In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Sub-
poena, 526 F. Supp. 1253, 1254 (D. Md. 1981) (technically accurate that grand jury is judicial
body); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Concerning Credit Bureau, Inc., 498 F.
Supp. 1174, 1177 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (grand jury status as constitutional entity does not make it
immune from court supervision); In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
(federal grand jury is judicial body created by fifth amendment to United States Constitu-
tion).
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judicial branch has the respon-
sibility to summon grand juries according to public need. See FED. R. CRnM. P. 6. The courts
retain extensive authority over the grand jury institution. See United States v. Calandra,
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courts point out that the grand jury's technical classification as primarily
a judicial body ignores the realities of grand jury proceedings." According
to the majority view, a grand jury is, for all practical purposes, a law en-
forcement agency that acts as an investigative and prosecutorial arm of
the government." Additionally, the majority of courts note that although
grand jury subpoenas are issued under the seal of the court, the court
clerk issues the subpoenas in blank to anyone requesting them, a factor
that supports a non-judicial characterization of grand juries." Therefore,
the majority view continues, grand jury subpoenas do not constitute
court orders under the FCRA particularly since Congress clearly intended
to deny government agencies access to consumer credit information
unless an agency could convince a court that sufficient need for the infor-
mation justified a court-ordered invasion of a consumer's privacy. 3
414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959); text accompany-
ing note 46 supra. The grand jury, therefore, is formally a creature of the court. See
FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 41, at 20.
70 See In re Gren, 633 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Application to Quash Grand
Jury Subpoena, 526 F. Supp. 1253, 1254 (D. Md. 1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Concerning Credit Bureau, Inc. 498 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Application
of Credit Info. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 969, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The grand jury is an important investigative instrument of the prosecutor. See Wilson
& Matz, supra note 47, at 683; 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 6.02(1) & (6) (2d ed. 1972).
Typically, the United States Attorney determines what matters the federal grand jury
should investigate. Wilson & Matz, supra note 47, at 683. Prosecutors, as professionals, take
an active role in the functioning of the grand jury system due to the layman grand juror's
inability to direct investigations. Id. The scope of grand jury investigations is subject to few
court-made limitations, making the grand jury a potent tool for the prosecutor. Id.; see
FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 41, at 4-5; PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 40, at 376-77;
text accompanying notes 39-55 supra.
" See In re Gren, 633 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Application to Quash Grand
Jury Subpoena, 526 F. Supp. 1253, 1254-55 (D. Md. 1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Concerning Credit Bureau, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Application
of Credit Info. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 969, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
72 See, e.g., In re Gren, 663 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1980) (courts exercise no prior con-
trol upon use of grand jury subpoenas that are analogous to administrative subpoenas); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecus Concerning Credit Bureaus, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1174,
1176-77 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (grand jury dependence on court mandates lesser status of sub-
poenas); In re Vaughn, 496 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (subpoena not court order
since court clerk issues subpoena at request of prosecutor); Application of Credit Info.
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 969, 971-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (grand jury subpoena is functional tool of pro-
secutor that receives no judicial consideration before issuance). Bur see In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 503 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. N.J. 1980) (grand jury subpoena is writ coming directly
from court); In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009-10 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (grand jury sub-
poena has no need of extra judicial'approval to constitute court order).
"s See In re Gren, 633 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Application to Quash Grand
Jury Subpoena, 526 F. Supp. 1253, 1254-55 (D. Md. 1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Concerning Credit Bureau, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1174, 1175 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re
Vaughn, 496 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Application of Credit Info. Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 969, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
An analysis of the distinction between a subpoena and a court order strengthens the
majority view that a grand jury subpoena is not a court order under the FCRA. The
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Other courts analyze the technical functions of the grand jury
system more rigidly, concluding that grand juries are appendages of the
court and that grand jury subpoenas are, therefore, court orders.74 In the
description of a subpoena is nearly identical under the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil
Procedure. FEDERAL RULES (Crim. Proc.) 53 (West 1979). FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a) provides as
follows:
Every subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the court, shall state
the name of the court and the title of the action, and shall command each person to
whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at a time and place therein
specified. The clerk shall issue a subpoena, or a subpoena for the production of
documentary evidence, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a party re-
questing it, who shall fill it in before service.
Id. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a) (quoted in note 48 supra). Sub-
poenas are, therefore, merely standardized forms that the clerk of court issues in blank to
the requesting party. Williams, supra note 16, at 457. Both the criminal and civil rules per-
mit liberal discovery of evidence through use of the subpoena process. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
16 (permissible areas of discovery in criminal proceedings; FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (scope of
discovery) & 34 (subpoena duces tecum process). The Federal Rules additionally provide,
however, that courts have the power to quash subpoenas and to issue protective or modify-
ing orders. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) & 16(d)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) & 26(c). In other words,
through use of its judicial order power, the court is the ultimate authority in determining
the validity of and need for subpoenaed information.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between the mere is-
suance of a subpoena and a court order for its enforcement in Brown v. United States, 359
U.S. 41, 49-50 (1959). The Brown case involved a grand jury witness who refused to answer
the grand jury's questions. Id. at 42. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the witness
was within his rights to refuse to answer until the grand jury obtained a court order, which
by means of its contempt sanction, compelled the witness to respond. Id. at 49-50. The
Brown decision emphasizes that, in the hierarchy of court proceedings, a court order is
much more powerful than a subpoena. Accord, Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 453 F. Supp.
798, 800 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (mere discovery issuance of subpoena that is subject to power of
court to quash or modify does not constitute specific judicial directive compelling disclosure
of records pursuant to Privacy Act of 1974). If a court directly participated in the issuance
of a subpoena, little need would exist for procedural rules that permit quashing or modifica-
tion of subpoenas pursuant to court order. Williams, supra note 16, at 467. Furthermore, if a
subpoena and a court order were truly equivalent, neither grand juries nor private litigants
would need to turn to a court for enforcement of discovery subpoenas. See note 46 supra.
The significance of court orders derives from the direct involvement of a judge who
determines whether an order is appropriate only after hearing articulated reasons concern-
ing the need for and relevancy of the desired information. See In re Vaughn, 496 F. Supp.
1080, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (requiring court order for dissemination of credit information
causes prosecutor to articulate need for and relevancy of information). Courts enter the
discovery process only after a conflict arises concerning a subpoena. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(d)(2) & 17(g); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a); Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report
No. 94-247, reprinted in FEDERAL RULES (Crim. Proc.) 50 (West 1979) (legislative history of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indicate that courts should involve themselves in
discovery only to resolve disputes). Subpoenas, therefore, are merely administrative for-
malities while court orders are valid, enforceable judicial decisions. Williams, supra note 16,
at 467-68; cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 503 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. N.J. 1980) (order of court
includes oral or written judicial commands, subpoenas, writs of execution, or other pro-
cesses without regard to form or procedure so long as issued from court of United States).
" See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 503 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. N.J. 1980); In re TRW, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1978); note 69 supra.
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minority view, a federal grand jury functions as a judicial body because
it is part of the federal constitutional system. 5 Additionally, at least one
court following this analysis emphasizes that federal judges summon, in-
struct, and advise grand jurors that they are to operate independently of
the United States Attorney."
Although the courts facing the grand jury subpoena issue reach op-
posing results, most use the same misleading analysis in attempting to
resolve the question of whether a grand jury subpoena should be a court
order for the purposes of the FCRA 7 The grand jury institution is
susceptible to classification as both an arm of the prosecutor and an ap-
pendage of the court. 8 An analysis based solely upon a rigid classifica-
tion of the institution is, therefore, an inaccurate way to determine if a
grand jury subpoena constitutes a privacy safeguard equal to that of a
court order for the purposes of the FCRA. The primary inquiry in cases
presenting the issue should be whether a grand jury, as a unique body,
provides consumers with adequate privacy protections when it sub-
poenas credit reports without the added security measure of a court
order.
Grand jury subpoenas are powerful devices79 that are subject to a
few procedural restrictions and have a long and sweeping reach." Yet,
subpoenas can be obtained without the direct involvement of the court."
Grand jury proceedings provide secrecy provisions to insure not only
the effectiveness of an investigation, but also the privacy of individuals
under investigation.82 The secrecy provisions, however, are far from in-
fallible, considering that witnesses are not subject to criminal sanctions
for disclosure of information." Therefore, if a grand jury subpoena is
"' See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 503 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. N.J. 1980); In re TRW, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Accord, United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503,
513 (1943) (grand jury is part of federal constitutional system).
76 See In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1978); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
17 Cf In re Vaughn, 496 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see text accompanying notes
68-76 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
71 See text accompanying notes 45-55 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
02 See text accompanying notes 56-65 supra.
See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra. Under the FCRA, in contrast to the
secrecy provisions of grand juries, credit reporting agencies are subject to both civil and
criminal penalties for wrongful disclosure of consumer credit information. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1681n, 1681o, & 1681r (1976 & Supp. II 1980). For example, officers of credit reporting agen-
cies that knowingly and willfully disclose information to unauthorized persons are subject to
a $5000 fine, imprisonment of one year, or both. Id. § 1681r. Negligent or willful non-
compliance with any provisions of the FCRA subjects a credit reporting agency to civil
liability for actual damages to the consumer, court costs, and in the case of willful non-
compliance, punitive damages. Id. §§ 1681n-1681o. Credit reporting agencies are reluctant,
therefore, to disseminate information without first ascertaining that the FCRA authorizes
disclosure.
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found to be the equivalent of a court order, the individual faces con-
siderable risk that his credit report, containing many potentially damag-
ing and irrelevant items, may become a matter of public record.
The legislative history of the FCRA does not discuss grand jury sub-
poenas. 4 In another act dealing with privacy rights, the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act (RFPA),85 Congress specifically indicated that the court
order exception permitting access to financial institution customer
records would include grand jury subpoenas.86 The legislative history of
the RFPA indicates that grand jury access is permissible under the
RFPA since grand juries are very important law enforcement
mechanisms that have adequate internal secrecy provisions. 7 Since the
general purpose of both the FCRA and the RFPA is to protect an in-
dividual's right to privacy,88 Congress arguably would have treated
grand juries in a similar manner had it explicitly considered the sub-
poena problem while the FCRA was pending. 9 Upon a closer examina-
tion of the RFPA, however, Congress expressly provided for many more
types of exemptions for the release of financial institution records than
it did for the release of credit reports under the FCRA.8 Since a grand
jury subpoena is one of many permissible reasons for information
disclosure, grand jury secrecy provisions may provide adequate privacy
protections within the context of the RFPA and, at the same time, not
provide sufficient privacy protections under the FCRA.
The FCRA explicitly states that strict control over consumer report-
ing agencies is necessary in order to assure the individual right to
privacy.8 Furthermore, credit reports potentially contain much more
" See text accompanying note 36 supra.
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. IV 1980).
The Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) limits access of government agencies to
financial institutions' customer records. Id. § 3402.
" See H.R. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 9358.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. IV 1980); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976 & Supp. II
1978; notes 4 & 9 supra.
89 At least one court has rejected the argument analogizing the FCRA and the RFPA.
See In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, 526 F. Supp. 1253, 1255-56 (D. Md.
1981). The Maryland district court declared that the two acts relate to different policy con-
siderations. Id. The court maintained that credit information is a small part of all possible.
financial records and that Congress indicated that credit information is particularly sen-
sitive. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
" See 12 U.S.C. § 3413 (Supp. IV 1980). Other exemptions that the RFPA provides in-
clude, for example, disclosure pursuant to administrative subpoenas, the Internal Revenue
Code, legitimate law enforcement inquiries, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in-
vestigation instituted by General Accounting Office. Id. Furthermore, the RFPA provides a
specific section dealing with grand jury information. See id. § 3420. The FCRA, on the other
hand, permits dissemination of credit information (absent a specific legitimate business
need) only upon the consent of the consumer or pursuant to a court order. See text accompa-
nying notes 10-15 & notes 33-35 supra.
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(4) (1976 & Supp. II 1978; note 4 supra.
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damaging and wideranging informatio than do financial institution
records.92 The nature of the computerized information industry and the
intrusive investigations that credit bureaus undertake render more dif-
ficult the problem of guaranteeing the right to privacy. 3 In view of the
problems inherent in the grand jury system' 4 the right to privacy should
not be undermined further by permitting grand juries to subpoena
credit reports. 5 Congress intended to provide an additional measure of
security in imposing the court order requirement. The court order re-
quirement, therefore, does not merely duplicate the secrecy protections
of the grand jury system, nor does it allow access to information as easily
as grand jury subpoenas that the clerk of court issues proforma. Grand
jury subpoenas, therefore, are not, and should not be considered the
functional equivalent of court orders within the scope of the FCRA.
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2 See note 6 supra. Credit reports cover and investigate many personal and private
aspects of an individual's life. Financial institution records, on the other hand, contain infor-
mation that an individual voluntarily has chosen to release to banking institutions.
" See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 47-55 & 61-64 supra.
9 See note 4 supra.
See note 11 supra.
, See generally Williams, supra note 16.
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